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 
Abstract— Deception has a long history in the study of intelligent 
systems. Animals and humans both gain several advantages from 
deception, hence researchers started developing different ways to 
introduce deception in robots and in two-player interactive games. This 
paper investigates deception in the context of motion using a simulated 
mobile robot. To our knowledge, there have been no foundational 
mathematical underpinnings developed for robot deception, but some 
researchers have worked in the past on specific robot deception 
applications. We first analyze some of the previously designed deceptive 
strategies on a mobile robot simulator. Then, we present a novel approach 
to randomly choose target-oriented deceptive trajectories in an adaptive 
manner to deceive humans in the long run. Additionally, we propose a new 
metric to evaluate deception in the data collected from the users when 
interacting with the mobile robot simulator. We performed three different 
user studies to test effectiveness of different deceptive strategies and our 
adaptive algorithm in the long run. The statistical evaluation of these 
studies showed that the proposed adaptive deceptive algorithm did deceive 
humans in the long run and it is more effective than a random choice of 
deceptive strategies. 
 
Index Terms— Competitive Games, Deception, Human-
Computer Interaction, Markov Process, Strategy Games 
I. INTRODUCTION 
URRENT research on computer games has been focused 
on  improvement of search techniques [1], artificial 
intelligence [2] and imparting effective information to the user  
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. For the latter, there is a natural counterpart: 
deception. Deception imparts wrong information or just 
conceals it completely and has a long history related to the study 
of intelligent systems. According to biologists and 
psychologists, deception provides an evolutionary advantage 
for the deceiver [8]. It has also been noted that higher-level 
primates use deception, which serves as an indicator of the 
theory of mind [9].  
Animals use different types of deception mechanisms to 
survive. For example, a grasshopper uses camouflage to 
deceive predators. There are other animals which deceive in a 
seemingly more intentional way. Chimpanzees, for example, 
[10], deceive based on the situation.  They can deceive an 
animal or human depending on their objectives. Squirrels or 
hamsters use a different type of deceptive strategy for food 
hoarding [11]. 
Robots in intelligent systems can also gain an advantage over 
rivals by practicing deceptive behavior. For example, one 
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application where robot deception has an impact is in the 
military [12] and real time strategy games. Although deception 
has plenty of potential benefits, there has been limited work 
done on deception in robots or interactive games. Almost all the 
work done in deception with robots and computer games to 
deceive humans has been application specific. Moreover, all the 
approaches are designed to deceive humans only for a single or 
a small set of interactions. No effort has been made in the past 
to develop a general algorithm that can deceive humans in the 
long run which is independent of the applications.  
This paper investigates the use of deceptive strategies 
proposed in [13] by autonomous mobile robot simulator that 
can be used in interactive computer games or military games. 
Particularly, the purpose of this research is to investigate and 
develop an algorithm, for a mobile robot simulator, that can 
deceive humans in the long run i.e. even if the humans have 
seen all the possible trajectories, the algorithm should still be 
able to deceive them. We believe that introducing deception 
will increase entertainment value of playing such games. This 
paper has three main objectives: 1) Extend the deceptive 
strategies presented in [13] and implement them on an 
autonomous mobile robot simulator 2) Develop a general 
algorithm to use these deceptive trajectories to deceive humans 
in the long run, 3) Develop a mathematical evaluation model to 
determine if the humans were indeed deceived by the robot. We 
show through a set of user studies that the humans can be 
deceived by a simulated mobile robot in the long run using the 
proposed algorithm and our approach is better at deceiving 
humans than just a simple random selection of deceptive 
strategies. We also evaluate the deceptive effectiveness of 
different deceptive strategies used by the mobile robot 
simulator when shown to humans once and multiple times. In 
addition, all the participants in the user studies said that 
interaction with the deceiving robot was more entertaining than 
the non-deceiving one. 
II. RELATED WORK 
There has not been much work done on deception techniques 
for vehicle simulators in computer games. Although, some 
research in deception using mobile vehicles or via motion has 
been done in the field of robotics in recent years. For example, 
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[13] developed different deceptive trajectories (see Fig. 1) in 
the case of a two target system and studied those trajectories’ 
deceptive effects on human participants. They used a 2 Degree 
of Freedom (DOF) robotic arm to generate the deceptive 
trajectories and performed different user studies. Their results 
showed that these strategies are deceptive when humans 
interact with them once but in the long run they are ineffective. 
To deceive humans in the long run, they developed six different 
trajectories using the combination of optimal and exaggerating 
trajectories, but their experiments were limited. For example, 
they only used the six different trajectories for six iterations. All 
these six trajectories were fixed, and the robot did not choose 
them in real time. Hence, this experiment was similar to 
interacting with six different trajectories once and if a human 
interacts with the robot again he/she will not be deceived by 
these six trajectories. Moreover, in their study, users were asked 
to guess the target in the middle of each strategy. This does not 
provide good information on whether the users were deceived 
because there is a 50% chance of guessing correctly. We 
developed a GUI for our experiments in which we collect the 
predictions of the users for the entire interactions. 
Targets:      1      2   1       2   1      2 
 
   Start        Start        Start 
(a) Exaggerating (b) Switching (c) Ambiguous 
Fig. 1. Three main deceptive trajectories. The trajectories in gray show the 
optimization trace, starting from the predictable trajectory [13] 
 
Wagner and Arkin [14] developed a game-theory based 
deception approach using a mobile robot in a hide-and-seek 
scenario to deceive other mobile robots. The deceiver robot 
used the model of the robot being deceived, for deception. 
Although the approach was general for deceiving other robots 
with a known model it cannot be used to deceive humans 
because of their ability to remember previous experiences.  
In this paper, we treat deceiving humans in the long run using 
a small set of deceptive strategies as a memory problem since 
they can remember previous interactions with the robot. 
Markov chains have been used in the past to model memory-
based systems [15], therefore could also be used to model 
deception processes. Nonlinear Markov games have been used 
in the past to model deception in the context of control theory 
[16, 17] but the work was quite limited, and it was not done in 
the context of deception. We propose a variation of the Markov 
decision process for choosing a deception strategy to deceive 
humans in the long run. The mathematical reasoning behind this 
approach is presented in section IV.   
III. DECEPTIVE STRATEGIES ON A MOBILE ROBOT 
SIMULATOR 
The three deceptive trajectories shown in Figure 1 were 
implemented on a robotic arm [13]. The first goal of this paper 
is to implement those strategies on a mobile robot simulator and 
test their efficiency in deceiving humans. We implemented the 
trajectories using the MATLAB robotics toolbox [18]. For the 
exaggerating trajectory, the robot was moved closer to the false 
target, using an optimal path and then moved to the real target 
optimally. For the switching trajectory, the robot alternated 
between two targets horizontally while vertically moving 
towards the real target and for the ambiguous trajectory, the 
robot was moved straight vertically at an equal distance from 
both targets and then moved towards the real target when it 
reached a certain distance from both targets. Fig.  2 shows the 
three trajectories implemented on the mobile robot simulator: 
Target 1      Target 2         Target 1       Target 2 
                   
   Start                 Start 
             (a) Exaggerating               (b) Switching 
Target 1      Target 2 
 
Start 
(c) Ambiguous 
Fig. 2. Three main deceptive strategies on a mobile robot simulator 
A. Version 2 of the main strategies 
Authors in  [13] conducted some surveys on how humans 
deceive when there are two targets available in an 
environment. Based on these surveys, some of the 
participants used one of the three deceptive trajectories 
shown in Fig. 1 moving their hand towards a target but then 
back to the other target at the last moment. In [13], the 
authors did not use this observation to deceive humans using 
the robot. We hypothesize that this strategy can be helpful 
when deceiving humans in the long run because once a 
person sees a deceptive trajectory, he/she will not get 
deceived again using the same trajectory. This variation can 
create some uncertainty for a person even if the trajectory 
looks familiar. In section VII, the results of the long run 
experiment show that the variation in these trajectories help 
maintain the deceptive effectiveness over the long run.  
 To implement version-2 of the three trajectories, we 
made one addition to the main trajectories: move the robot 
back to the other target once it finishes the main trajectory. 
Figure 3 shows version-2 of the three trajectories:  
Target 1      Target 2     Target 1         Target 2 
              
                Start             Start 
  (a) Exaggerating (version 2)             (b) Switching (version 2) 
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Target 1      Target 2 
 
Start 
(c) Ambiguous (version 2) 
Fig. 3. Version 2 of the three deceptive strategies in which the robot goes 
back to the other target at the last moment 
B. Optimal Strategy 
Another addition to our long run deception algorithm was the 
inclusion of the optimal trajectory i.e. move the robot to the 
real target using an optimal path. This trajectory is not 
deceptive, and it imparts true information, but we 
hypothesize that humans will get deceived by it once they 
have interacted with the robot and seen the other deceptive 
trajectories (particularly exaggerating because it is the same 
as the optimal trajectory in the start). The results shown in 
section VII prove our hypothesis. This trajectory (see Fig. 4) 
was also implemented in MATLAB Robotics Systems 
Toolbox [18] by optimally moving the robot to the real target, 
using the built in probabilistic roadmap algorithm. 
 
  Target 1      Target 2 
 
Start 
Fig. 4. Optimal strategy in which the robot simply just goes to the intended 
target 
IV. REPRESENTING DECEPTION IN THE LONG RUN USING 
MARKOV PROCESS 
As mentioned earlier, even if a strategy is deceptive, once the 
human interacts with it for some iterations, he/she cannot be 
deceived again using the same strategy. Hence, we propose that 
the probability of selection of strategies in each iteration should 
be dependent upon the strategies chosen in previous iterations. 
A simple Markov chain can be used to model the transition 
probabilities among different states (deceptive strategies) based 
on the choice of previous states. In this paper, we have the three 
main strategies and the optimal strategy to choose from at each 
iteration (We will call these strategies, states in the Markov 
process context). After the choice of the main strategy, there is 
a choice between the main version or the 2nd version of the 
strategies. Fig. 5 shows the first order Markov chain model of 
the four strategies with their corresponding transition 
probabilities. Selection between the main and 2nd version can 
be similarly represented as two states with corresponding 
transition probabilities.  
 
Fig. 5. Markov chain for four states with transition probabilities from each 
state to every other state.  
 
Where S0, S1, S2, and S3 denote the exaggerating, 
switching, ambiguous and optimal trajectories, respectively and 
𝑃𝑖𝑗  ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {0,1,2,3} represents the transition probability from 
state 𝑖 to state 𝑗. Since at each iteration the probability of 
occurrence of each strategy should be dependent upon the 
strategies selected in all the previous iterations, it could be 
modeled as a higher order Markov process. However, the higher 
order Markov process is not feasible for implementation 
because the order of the process will increase with the number 
of iterations. If the state-transition probabilities are not fixed, 
the memory required to keep track of the all the previous states 
and the corresponding transition probabilities will increase as 
well. To deal with this, we introduced a reset parameter which 
is explained in the next section. Furthermore, the non-
optimality of using fixed state-transition probabilities for long 
run deception experiment is also explained in the next section. 
V. DECEPTION ALGORITHMS IN THE LONG RUN 
Generally, in a Markov process, the state transition 
probabilities are fixed and saved in a matrix. Using fixed 
probabilities for the strategies for all iterations can deceive 
humans in the long run because of the random selection of the 
states. However, this approach is not optimal because all the 
transition probabilities must be fixed at the same value (i.e. ¼ 
for the four states) for maximum uncertainty. Due to the fixed 
probabilities, the chance of consecutively recurring strategies 
remains constant and the humans will not get deceived because 
of this repetition. We call this approach the “random 
algorithm”.  
Entropy analysis of the random algorithm also provides some 
insight into why this approach is not perfect for deception. 
Entropy is the measure of uncertainty of a certain event and is 
defined as [19]:  
 
𝐻(𝑆) = − ∑ 𝑝(𝑆𝑖) log(𝑝(𝑆𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1                             (1)  
 
Where  𝐻(𝑆) is the entropy of the random variable 𝑆𝑖 which 
represents the strategy choice i.e. 1, 2, 3 or 4 (exaggerating, 
switching, ambiguous or optimal), 𝑛 is the total number of 
states and p is the probability of occurrence of each strategy, in 
the total number of iterations, and is defined as: 
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𝑝(𝑆𝑖) =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑖  𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
 
If the experiment is run by randomly choosing a strategy at each 
iteration, the probability of selection of a state will be ¼ due to 
the uniform distribution. With no updates on this probability of 
selection of a state, there is an extremely low chance that all the 
states will occur an equal number of times within an 
experiment, which means that 𝑝(𝑆𝑖) will not be ¼. This reduces 
the entropy of the system, which in turn decreases deception. 
We conducted an experiment of 100 iterations in MATLAB (to 
model the long run experiment for human interaction) and in 
each iteration one of the four states was chosen based on the 
uniform probability distribution. For humans, 100 interactions 
are more than enough in the context of long run deception 
experiment. We observed that the probability of occurrence of 
the states was not uniform and the entropy was lower (1.89) 
than the maximum value of 2 (see Fig. 6) because some states 
occurred more times than the others with high repetition rate.  
These results show that the random algorithm is not the best for 
deceiving humans in the long run. In section VII, results of the 
experiments to deceive human participants using the random 
algorithm affirm our hypothesis. 
 
Fig. 6. Probabilities of occurrence for four states using the random 
algorithm in 100 iterations.  
 
 One way to ensure entropy remains maximum in the long run 
is by forcing each strategy to occur equal number of times in all 
iterations by using a Markov decision process to remember 
previously occurred strategies. We call this strategy the “fixed 
algorithm”. This strategy maximizes entropy and seems to be 
perfect for deception in the long run but fixing the total number 
of occurrences of states can have disadvantages of its own. 
 
There are two ways to implement the fixed algorithm. First, 
each state is fixed to occur once in four runs. Second, all states 
are fixed to occur equal amount of times in the set of all 
iterations, while choosing each state randomly in a single 
iteration. Although, both of these implementations of the fixed 
algorithm ensure maximum entropy, they are not optimal for 
deception in the long run. For the first approach, since each 
strategy occurs once in a set of four iterations, a human can 
detect this pattern easily which will decrease deception. The 
second approach poses almost the same problem as the random 
algorithm in which a state can occur multiple times in a row or 
in a set of four iterations, hence decreasing deception.  
 To fix these issues, we developed an approach to transition a 
part of the probability of the states that occur more to the ones 
that occur less at a given iteration in the process. Hence, this 
probability transition approach is a combination of the random 
and fixed algorithms.  In the next sub-section, this approach is 
mathematically justified. 
A. Terminology 
Before explaining the probability transition equations, we 
first define some terminology that will be used in the next 
equations. 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟: 
In a Markov process, a transition rate parameter 𝜆  is defined as 
a variable that controls the rate of transition of probability from 
one state 𝑆𝑖 that occurs at a given iteration to another state as: 
𝜆 =
1
𝑚
                      (2)  
Where 𝑚 is an integer number i.e. 𝑚 = 1,2,3, …. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡: 
We described in the previous subsection that with variable 
state-transition probabilities the order of the Markov process 
and the memory requirement will grow linearly with the 
number iterations. To address this issue, we define the concept 
of a reset in our Markov process. A reset occurs whenever all 
the states in the Markov process have been chosen at least once. 
Once reset occurs, the probabilities that were transitioned in 
earlier iterations from other states to the most recent state are 
transitioned back. In other words, the reset changes the 
probabilities of all the states to take them back one occurrence. 
For example, when there are four states and three of the states 
were chosen in the first three iterations, the probabilities of 
occurrence of all the states will be: [1/8, 1/8, 1/8, 
(1/4+1/8+1/8+1/8)] (with transition rate parameter=0.5). The 
last state contains the transitioned probabilities from the other 
three states. If the fourth state is chosen in the fourth iteration, 
reset will occur and the probabilities will be transitioned back 
making the probability vector: [1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4]. This 
probability vector takes all the states one occurrence back 
indicating that all the states occurred 0 times, when in reality 
they all occurred one time each. Using a reset is similar to the 
fixed algorithm approach except that in this case the probability 
of occurrence of a state is not changed to zero if it occurs once 
in four iterations. 
  
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟: 
A state counter 𝐶𝑖𝑘 of state 𝑆𝑖  , in a Markov process at iteration 
𝑘, is defined as the total number of times the state 𝑆𝑖 has 
occurred more than the least occurred state in the Markov 
process. Whenever there is a reset in the process, the counter 
value of each state in the Markov process will be decreased by 
1. 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦: 
In a Markov process, the base probability 𝑝𝑏  is defined as the 
initial probability of each state before the process starts: 
𝑝𝑏 =
1
𝑛
                      (3)  
Where 𝑛 is the total number of possible states in the Markov 
process. The base probability 𝑝(𝑆𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖 (to simplify notation) 
of a state 𝑆𝑖 can decrease based upon how many times it occurs 
in the process. Whenever the state 𝑆𝑖 occurs at an iteration 𝑘 in 
the process its base probability 𝑝𝑖𝑘 at iteration 𝑘 will be 
decreased and a part of that base probability will be transmitted 
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to other states with state counter values lower than the state 
counter value of the state 𝑆𝑖. 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦: 
In a Markov process, the transition probability 𝑤𝑖𝑘 for a state 
𝑆𝑖 at iteration 𝑘 will be the sum of all probabilities transmitted 
to this state from all the other states whose state counter values 
are higher than the state counter value of state 𝑆𝑖.   
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟:  
In a Markov process, a transition factor 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑘  is defined as a 
variable that controls the equal distribution of the probability 
from a state 𝑆𝑖 (with state counter value 𝐶𝑖𝑘) that occurs at 
iteration 𝑘, to all the states 𝑆𝑗  with state counter values lower 
than 𝐶𝑖𝑘. Mathematically the transition factor at iteration 𝑘 is 
described as: 
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑘 = {
0                  𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝐶𝑖𝑘
1
𝑙
                              𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
               (4)  
Where, 
𝑙 = ∑ 1𝑛𝑟=1
𝑟≠𝑖
    ∀𝑆𝑟:  𝐶𝑟𝑘 < 𝐶𝑖𝑘                      (5)  
𝑙 is the total number of states whose state counter values are 
lesser than 𝐶𝑖𝑘 at iteration 𝑘 and 𝐶𝑗𝑘 is the state counter value 
for state 𝑆𝑗 at iteration 𝑘. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟:  
In a Markov process, a residue factor 𝑏𝑖𝑘  for a state 𝑆𝑖 with state 
counter value 𝐶𝑖𝑘 at iteration 𝑘, is defined as a variable that 
determines the amount of probability transmitted from other 
states (with same state counter values as 𝐶𝑖𝑘) in earlier iterations 
to  state  𝑆𝑖 . Mathematically the residue factor for a state 𝑆𝑖 at 
iteration 𝑘 is described as: 
𝑏𝑖𝑘 =
𝑧
𝑙+1
                                             (6)  
Where, 
𝑧 = ∑ 1𝑛𝑟=1
𝑟≠𝑖
                       ∀𝑆𝑟: 𝐶𝑟𝑘 = 𝐶𝑖𝑘  
𝑧 is the total number of states whose state counter 𝐶𝑟𝑘 at 
iteration 𝑘 is equal 𝐶𝑖𝑘 as defined in the above expressions and 
𝑙 is defined in equation (5). 
B. Probability Transition Equations 
Now that all the terminology is defined, we will explain our 
complete algorithm and the mathematical equations for 
probability transitions in detail. The basic idea of the approach 
is that whenever a state occurs in an iteration, a part of its 
probability is transmitted equally among the other states which 
have occurred less than this state at the current iteration. The 
amount of probability to be transmitted is determined by the 
transition rate parameter and the state counter values.  
The designed probability transition equations are not just 
applicable to the given situation when there are four states only 
but on any number of states with any number of iterations. 
Before the probability transition equations are defined, it should 
be noted that the base probability of a state 𝑆𝑖 at iteration 𝑘 is 
represented as 𝑝𝑖 𝑘 and any probability transmitted from other 
states to state 𝑆𝑖 is represented as 𝑤𝑖 𝑘 (transition probability). 
When there is not a reset, the process of probability transition 
is defined by equations (7), (8) and (9). Equations (7) and (8) 
show the amount of probability removed from the base 
probability and trans probability, respectively, of state 𝑆𝑖 that 
occurs at iteration 𝑘. The amounts of probability to be removed 
from 𝑝𝑖 𝑘−1 and 𝑤𝑖 𝑘−1 is determined by the transition rate 
parameter 𝜆 and the residue factor (𝑏𝑖𝑘) of state 𝑆𝑖 at iteration 
𝑘. The probabilities removed from 𝑝𝑖 𝑘−1 and 𝑤𝑖 𝑘−1 are equally 
distributed, based upon the transition factor (𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑘), into all the 
states 𝑆𝑗 whose state counter values are lower than 𝐶𝑖𝑘, as 
defined by equation (9).   
𝑝𝑖𝑘 = (1 − 𝜆)𝑝𝑖𝑘−1 (7)                                  
𝑤𝑖𝑘 = 𝑤𝑖𝑘−1 − 𝑏𝑖𝑘𝜆𝑝𝑖𝑘−1 (8)                         
𝑤𝑗𝑘 = 𝑤𝑗𝑘−1 + 𝜆𝑝𝑖𝑘−1𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑘(1 + 𝑏𝑖𝑘) (9)  
Where 𝑝𝑖𝑘−1 and 𝑤𝑖𝑘−1 are the  base and trans probabilities, 
respectively, of state 𝑆𝑖 at iteration 𝑘 − 1. 𝑤𝑗𝑘 and 𝑤𝑗𝑘−1 are the 
trans probabilities of state 𝑆𝑗 at iterations 𝑘 and 𝑘 − 1, 
respectively.  
In case of a reset, all the states’ base probabilities and the 
transition probabilities are changed one counter back. At first, 
the base probabilities of all the states, other than the one that 
occurred at iteration 𝑘, are changed back to probabilities one 
occurrence back (equation (10)) and the probability transmitted 
by any of the states in earlier iterations is removed from the 
trans probability of the corresponding states (equation (11)). 
After these steps, based on the new counter values the 
transmitted probabilities in the states’ transition probabilities 
are redistributed. Equation (12) shows how much of the 
probability is removed and added to different states’ transition 
probabilities.  
∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖       𝑝𝑗𝑘 =
1
1−𝜆
𝑝𝑗𝑘−1 (10)                                            
𝑤𝑗𝑘 = 𝑤𝑗𝑘−1 − ∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑟=1
𝐶𝑟𝑘>𝐶𝑗𝑘
𝑟≠𝑗
𝜆𝑝𝑟𝑘 (11)
                               
𝑤𝑗𝑘 = 𝑤𝑗𝑘−1 + ∑ (
𝜆
1−𝜆
) 𝑝𝑟𝑘(𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑘 − 𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑘−1)
𝑛
𝑟=1
𝐶𝑟𝑘>𝐶𝑗𝑘
𝑟≠𝑗
 (12)
  
Where 𝑎𝑟𝑗𝑘  is the transition factor that controls the equal 
distribution of probability transmitted from the base probability 
𝑝𝑟𝑘 of state 𝑆𝑟  with state counter value 𝐶𝑟𝑘 at iteration 𝑘 to state 
𝑆𝑗 with state counter value 𝐶𝑗𝑘 lower than 𝐶𝑟𝑘 at iteration 𝑘.   
Intuitively, it can be observed from (7), that the higher the 
value of  𝜆 the higher the amount of probability removed from 
a state after it occurs at an iteration. This increases the chance 
of other states to occur in the next iterations. If 𝜆 = 0, the 
approach will become the fixed algorithm and if it is 1 the 
approach will become the random algorithm. We ran a set of 
simulations at different values of 𝜆 and 0.5 ensured a good 
tradeoff between entropy and repetition of states. We call this 
probability transition approach with 𝜆 = 0.5, the adaptive 
algorithm.  Fig. 9 shows the experiment of 100 iterations using 
the adaptive algorithm with 𝜆 = 0.5. The entropy of the system 
(1.998) is not equal to the maximum value of 2, but it is only 
slightly lower and it is much higher than the entropy of the 
random algorithm and unlike the fixed algorithms the pattern is 
not easy to predict and has randomness in the selection of states. 
In section VII, results shown for experiments run with human 
participants using the adaptive algorithm affirm our analysis. 
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Fig. 9. Probabilities of occurrence for four states using the adaptive 
algorithm where lambda=0.5 in 100 iterations.  
 
Both the adaptive and the random algorithms were 
implemented in MATLAB and a GUI (Fig. 10) was developed 
for collecting deception data on humans. For every iteration, 
after the start button is pressed, the GUI shows the simulated 
robot moving towards one of the two targets using one of the 
deception strategies. The deception strategy can be selected by 
either the random or the adaptive algorithm. During the robot 
movement, the human observer can predict the robot’s 
destination by moving the scrolling pad, at top of the GUI, 
either left or right. The scrolling pad values range from 0 (left 
target) to 1 (right target) and for each interaction all the pad 
values are collected to analyze whether or how much the human 
was deceived by the corresponding deceptive strategy. In 
section VII we show the results of the data collected from 
humans through this GUI using the adaptive and random 
algorithms.  
 
 
Fig. 10. GUI used for collecting human deception data. In the figure above, 
the robot uses the optimal strategy to move towards the left target. 
VI. EVALUATION METRIC TO RATE DECEPTION 
We developed a metric to evaluate the deception data 
collected from the GUI. Deception is defined as imparting false 
information or hiding true information. Based on this definition, 
a human observer interacting with the GUI will be considered 
deceived when he/she believes that the false target is the true 
one or he/she is uncertain about the true target. Hence, distance 
of the pad from the true target during an interaction shows the 
inaccuracy of the human in predicting the true target and 
movements of the pad shows the uncertainty of the human 
about his/her prediction. 
Based on these intuitions, we define two metrics to evaluate 
deception in humans: accuracy and confidence. Accuracy 
measures the distance of the pad from the true target in an 
interaction, defined as: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
1
𝜏
 ∫ |𝑇 − 𝜇(𝑡)|𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
             (13) 
Where T represents the true target (0 or 1), 𝜇(𝑡) is the pad 
position at time 𝑡 and 𝜏 is the total time of an interaction with 
the robot. Accuracy=0 shows that the pad was at the true target 
for the entire time indicating no deception; similarly, 
accuracy=1 indicates maximum deception.  
Confidence measures the belief of the human in his/her 
choice of the target and is defined as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  
1
𝜏
 ∫ 𝑡|𝜇′(𝑡)|𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
              (14) 
 where 𝜇′(𝑡) is the derivative of the pad position at time 𝑡. 
Since the pad can only be moved at a constant rate, 𝜇′(𝑡) will 
either be 0 (no movement) or a constant value (movement). A 
confidence value of 0 indicates that the user never moved the 
pad indicating 100% belief in his/her choice of the target (right 
or wrong) and 1 (normalized) indicates maximum uncertainty. 
The rationale for putting t inside the integral is that as time goes 
on, the human acquires more data on the robot's behavior, so we 
expect motion at the end of the time interval to be more 
indicative of the human's confidence.  
We exclude the data for the first 5% and the last 5% of the 
time of the interaction from the above-mentioned equations. 
Since targets are selected randomly and the robot starts at an 
equal distance from the target, the starting 5% of the time is just 
based on the guess of the user. During the last 5% of the time, 
the robot moves towards the true target; hence, collecting that 
data is pointless. Also, for the confidence equation (14), we 
exclude the initial pad movements toward a target and start 
counting after the participants start to move the pad in the 
opposite direction. The reason is because the pad starts in the 
middle, and the user has to move it towards one of the targets 
for prediction. In the next section, we present a user study to 
gather data from human participants over the course of 20 
iterations using the adaptive and random algorithms and 
evaluate them using these metrics. 
VII. EXPERIMENTS 
For the evaluation of the deceptive strategies on a mobile 
robot simulator and the long run deceptive experiment, we 
performed three user studies.  
A. Study 1  
In the first study, we evaluated the deceptive effectiveness of 
the three main deceptive strategies (proposed by [13] and 
modified for our robot simulator) when shown once and then 
multiple times to a person. We chose a total of 35 participants 
(20 male, 15 female) from Penn State between the ages of 18 to 
27 for the study. The participants were first shown two example 
scenarios where the robot moved towards the true target 
optimally. After the example round, they were shown the three 
deceptive trajectories consecutively five times. The participants 
predicted the true target using the scrolling pad on the GUI. We 
propose the following two hypotheses:  
 
H1: All three strategies are deceptive when shown once to 
humans. 
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H2: Deception decreases if a strategy is shown multiple times 
to a human. 
 We calculated the accuracy and confidence values from the 
pad values collected for all 15 iterations for all participants. We 
performed a single-sample t-test analysis (with 5% significance 
level)for accuracy and confidence values for the first iteration 
of the three strategies with the reference means of 0.5 (for 
accuracy) and 0.9 (for confidence). It is clear from the mean and 
p-values (Table 1) of accuracy and confidence for the three 
strategies that all the means, except the confidence for 
ambiguous, are significantly higher than the reference means. 
The mean value for the confidence of ambiguous is similar to 
the reference mean. These results prove that the three strategies 
are deceptive when shown once to the users.  
 
 Accuracy (Reference 
Mean = 0.5) 
Confidence (Reference 
Mean = 0.9) 
Strategy Mean P Value Mean P Value 
Exaggerating 0.75 2.4 ∗ 10−10 0.95 6.5 ∗ 10−7 
Switching 0.66 2.2 ∗ 10−9 0.92 4.8 ∗ 10−5 
Ambiguous 0.6 4.8 ∗ 10−5 0.88 0.034 
Table 1. Single sample t-test analysis results for the three strategies when 
shown once to a user 
 
A two-sample t-test analysis (with 5% significance level) 
was performed for the accuracy and confidence values for the 
first and last iteration for each of the strategies (p values for 
accuracy and mean of all strategies equal to zero). The results 
show that the difference between the two datasets is extremely 
significant and the mean values of the first iteration data are 
significantly higher than the last iteration data, which proves 
H2. Figs. 11 and 12 show the mean accuracy and confidence 
values, respectively, of all the strategies for five iterations over 
all the participants’ data which agrees with our t-test analyses.     
 
Fig. 11. Mean accuracy values of the three strategies for five iterations 
  
 
Fig. 12. Mean confidence values of the three strategies for five iterations   
B. Study 2  
The second study was performed for the evaluation of the 
deceptive effectiveness of our proposed adaptive algorithm. A 
total of 30 participants (16 male, 14 female) between the ages 
of 18 to 25 were recruited for this study from Penn State. All 
these participants were different from the ones chosen for the 
previous study. The participants were shown a total of 20 
iterations and in each iteration the deceptive strategy was 
chosen using the state transition probabilities generated by the 
adaptive algorithm. The participants were asked to move the 
scrolling pad on the top of the GUI to either of the targets using 
the left and right arrow keys on the keyboard. The scrolling pad 
represented the target prediction of the participants. During 
each interaction, the pad positions of each participant were 
saved. Before the 20 iterations, participants played with the 
robot a couple of practice rounds in which the optimal strategy 
was shown to get familiar with the environment. We collected 
this data as well for comparison with the optimal strategy data 
in the long run. We tested the following hypotheses using the 
data obtained from this experiment: 
 
H1: All participants are deceived by the adaptive algorithm in 
the long run (particularly in the last 5 iterations). 
H2: Optimal trajectory is deceptive when used in the adaptive 
algorithm. 
H3: Exaggerating and switching strategies are more deceptive 
than the ambiguous strategy in the long run (based on the 
results of study 1). 
H4: Exaggerating, switching and ambiguous strategies are 
more deceptive than the optimal strategy in the long run (based 
on the results of the practice round data). 
 
 As with study 1, we calculated the accuracy and confidence 
values for each iteration for all the participants and performed 
single sample t-test analyses (with 5% significance level) on 
accuracy and confidence values of each iteration for all the 
participants with reference means of 0.5 and 0.95, respectively. 
Table 2 represents the results of the t-test analyses for each 
iteration. The mean accuracy values for all the iterations were 
around 0.5 or higher which shows that the participants predicted 
the wrong target about 50% of the time during each iteration. 
The mean confidence values stayed around 0.95 which shows 
high uncertainty in the choice of the targets in each iteration. 
Results also show that the accuracy and confidence values 
remained in a similar range over 20 iterations which proves H1. 
Figures 15 and 16 show the mean accuracy and mean 
confidence values, respectively, for the adaptive and random 
algorithms, which agree with the t-test analysis. 
 
 Accuracy (Reference 
Mean (R) = 0.5) 
Confidence (Reference 
Mean (R) = 0.95) 
Iteration 
Number 
Mean 
(M) 
P 
Value 
Infere
nce 
Mean 
(M) 
P 
Value 
Infere
nce 
1 0.5703 0.0066 M>R 0.8504 0.2109 M>R 
2 0.5403 0.0992 M≈R 0.8726 0.5241 M≈R 
3 0.5112 0.7479 M≈R 0.7239 0.0201 M>R 
4 0.5295 0.4494 M≈R 0.5426 1.5*
10−4 
M<R 
5 0.5333 0.1144 M≈R 0.8526 0.2759 M≈R 
6 0.5108 0.5081 M≈R 0.8784 0.5189 M≈R 
7 0.4991 0.9521 M≈R 0.8486 0.2484 M≈R 
8 0.4936 0.6555 M≈R 0.8869 0.6562 M≈R 
9 0.5225 0.1276 M≈R 0.8851 0.6181 M≈R 
10 0.5333 0.0511 M≈R 0.8656 0.2665 M≈R 
11 0.5233 0.1655 M≈R 0.8657 0.2861 M≈R 
12 0.4848 0.3351 M≈R 0.8652 0.2787 M≈R 
13 0.5040 0.7992 M≈R 0.8510 0.1366 M≈R 
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14 0.5174 0.4818 M≈R 0.7981 0.0565 M≈R 
15 0.4775 0.3227 M≈R 0.8167 0.1064 M≈R 
16 0.4802 0.3705 M≈R 0.8271 0.0942 M≈R 
17 0.4729 0.2003 M≈R 0.8211 0.0856 M≈R 
18 0.4747 0.2342 M≈R 0.8130 0.0632 M≈R 
19 0.4873 0.5158 M≈R 0.8640 0.2744 M≈R 
20 0.5042 0.8338 M≈R 0.8635 0.3366 M≈R 
Table 2. Single sample t-test analysis of accuracy and confidence values 
for 20 iterations 
 The mean accuracy and mean confidence values for the 
optimal strategy when shown independently were 0.1 and 0.5 
respectively, and 0.5 and 0.8 respectively when shown with the 
adaptive algorithm. These results show that the optimal strategy 
is only deceptive when shown with the other strategies using 
the adaptive algorithm, which proves H2. 
 We also found the mean accuracy and confidence values of 
the four strategies for each of their occurrences in the 20 
iterations (Figs. 13 and 14). The first occurrence of each 
strategy was in the first five iterations; occurrences 2 and 3 were 
in the middle, and occurrences 4 and 5 were in the last five 
iterations. Two sample t-test analysis (with 5% significance 
level) between the accuracy and confidence values of the five 
occurrences of all participants for exaggerating and ambiguous 
strategies, and between switching and ambiguous strategies for 
the five occurrences were performed. Table 3 shows that the 
accuracy value for switching was only higher than the 
ambiguous in the first occurrence and lower in the third 
occurrence. The difference was insignificant for the other three 
occurrences, while there was no significant difference between 
the confidence values of the two strategies for five occurrences. 
The difference between the accuracy values of exaggerating 
and ambiguous and the confidence values was insignificant for 
all five occurrences. These results show that ambiguous 
strategy is equally deceptive as exaggerating and switching in 
the long run, which disproves H3.  
We also performed two-sample t-test analyses (with 5% 
significance level) between the optimal and the three deceptive 
strategies (p-values in table 4). There was no significant 
difference between the accuracy and confidence values of the 
exaggerating and optimal strategies and ambiguous and optimal 
strategies for all five occurrences. The accuracy value of 
switching was only higher in the first occurrence while the 
confidence values were lower in the second and fifth 
occurrences. For all other occurrences the difference between 
the accuracy and confidence values was insignificant. These 
results show that in the long run all strategies are equally 
deceptive when shown with the adaptive algorithm, which 
disproves H4. These results also show that in the long run, the 
choice of the strategies using the adaptive algorithm has a 
bigger effect on imparting deception than the deceptive 
strategies themselves which makes the deceptive effectiveness 
of all the strategies similar.   
 
Fig. 13. Mean accuracy values for five occurrences of all four strategies  
 
Fig. 14. Mean confidence values for five occurrences of all four strategies  
 Accuracy  Confidence 
Occurre
nce 
Number 
1 vs 3 
P 
Value 
2 vs 3 
P 
Value 
Inferen
ces 
1 vs 3 
P 
Value 
2 vs 3 
P 
Value 
Inferen
ces 
1 0.2448 0.0069 1≈3 
2>3 
0.1003 0.0920 1≈3 
2≈3 
2 0.5033 0.728 1≈3 
2≈3 
0.8458 0.7345 1≈3 
2≈3 
3 0.2577 0.0048 1≈3 
2<3 
0.8894 0.5671 1≈3 
2≈3 
4 0.308 0.2123 1≈3 
2≈3 
0.3952 0.9790 1≈3 
2≈3 
5 0.4345 0.9996 1≈3 
2≈3 
0.4752 0.1064 1≈3 
2≈3 
Table 3. Two-sample t-test analyses between exaggerating (1) and 
ambiguous (3) and switching (2) and ambiguous (1) for five occurrences 
 
 Accuracy Confidence  
Occurre
nce 
Number 
1 vs 4 
P 
Value 
2 vs 4 P 
Value 
3 vs 4 
P 
Value 
1 vs 4 
P 
Value 
2 vs 4 P 
Value 
3 vs 4 
P 
Value 
1 0.224 0.001  
(Higher) 
0.756 0.0587 0.036 
(Lower) 
0.540 
2 0.094 0.236 0.367 0.6468 0.418 0.946 
3 0.392 0.332 0.053 0.18 0.174 0.282 
4 0.34 0.25 0.882 0.2467 0.467 0.761 
5 0.093 0.255 0.302 0.086 0.044  
(Lower) 
0.44 
Table 4. Two-sample t-test analyses between exaggerating (1) and optimal 
(4), switching (2) and optimal and ambiguous (3) and optimal strategies for 
five occurrences 
 
After the 20 iterations, participants were asked to rate on a 
Likert scale of 1-7 (1 lowest, 7 highest) how intelligence, trust, 
deception and entertainment of interacting with the robot 
simulator changed. We also asked the participants if the robot’s 
movement was intentional and all of them said yes. We 
proposed the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: Ratings for entertainment, deception and intelligence 
increase and decrease for trust.  
 
Single-sample t-test analyses (with 5% significance level) on 
the Likert scale data for entertainment, deception, intelligence 
and trust with reference mean of 3.5 (Entertainment: 
mean=6.077, p-value=4.3∗ 10−30; Deception: mean=4.808, p-
value= 6.44∗ 10−22; Intelligence: mean=6.805, p-value=5.83∗
10−33, Trust: mean=2.249, p-value=1.56∗ 10−20) show that 
entertainment, deception and intelligence were significantly 
higher than the reference mean and trust rating was significantly 
lower, which proves H5. Fig. 14 shows the mean Likert scale 
ratings for all four variables, which agree with the t-test 
analyses. 
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Fig. 14. Entertainment, deception, intelligence and trust ratings by the 
participants after interacting with the simulator for 20 iterations 
C. Study 3  
In this study, we performed a similar experiment as in study 
2 of 20 iterations with 30 participants (19 male, 11 female, 
different from the ones that did study 2) between the ages of 18 
to 25 from Penn State. The only difference was that the 
strategies were chosen using the random algorithm in each 
iteration. We collected this data to compare the deceptive 
effectiveness of the two algorithms. We proposed the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: The adaptive algorithm is better than the random algorithm 
in deceiving humans in the long run. 
 
Two-sampled t-test analysis (with 5% significance level) 
between the accuracy and confidence values of the two 
algorithms (Table 5) shows that the accuracy and confidence 
values for the first four iterations of the adaptive and random 
algorithms are similar, but for the rest of the iterations, adaptive 
algorithm has significantly higher values than the random 
algorithm except confidence value for the last iteration. These 
results prove H1. Fig. 15 and 16 show the mean accuracy and 
confidence values respectively, of the adaptive and random 
algorithm for 20 iterations. They show that in the starting 
iterations both algorithms have similar accuracy and confidence 
values but in later iterations, these values drop for the random 
algorithm but remain in the same range for the adaptive 
algorithm, which agrees with our t-test analysis results. 
 Accuracy  Confidence 
Iteration 
Number 
P Value Inference P Value Inference 
1 0.0745 A≈R 0.3301 A≈R 
2 0.0644 A≈R 0.1574 A≈R 
3 0.0826 A≈R 0.3788 A≈R 
4 0.0748 A≈R 0.56 A≈R 
5 0.0011 A>R 0.0088 A>R 
6 6.88∗ 10−4 A>R 0.0021 A>R 
7 0.0016 A>R 0.0015 A>R 
8 2.26∗ 10−5 A>R 0.0089 A>R 
9 1.35∗ 10−5 A>R 0.0169 A>R 
10 2.11∗ 10−5 A>R 0.0037 A>R 
11 0.0091 A>R 0.0018 A>R 
12 7.27∗ 10−4 A>R 0.0034 A>R 
13 0.0020 A>R 0.0051 A>R 
14 0.0143 A>R 0.0011 A>R 
15 0.0163 A>R 0.0072 A>R 
16 3.5∗ 10−4 A>R 0.065 A≈R 
17 1.88∗ 10−4 A>R 0.0824 A>R 
18 0.0178 A>R 0.0541 A>R 
19 0.0034 A>R 0.0091 A>R 
20 3.46∗ 10−6 A>R 0.0751 A≈R 
Table 5. Two-tailed p-values of the two-sample t-test analysis between the 
accuracy and confidence values of the adaptive (A) and random (R) 
algorithms for 20 iterations 
 
 
Fig. 15. Mean accuracy values of the adaptive and random algorithms for 
20 iterations 
 
Fig. 16. Mean confidence values of the adaptive and random algorithms for 
20 iterations 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented three different deception 
strategies from a “goal” directed perspective on an autonomous 
mobile robot simulator. We an adaptive deception algorithm 
that can deceive humans in the short and long run using four 
different strategies. Different user studies validated the 
hypothesis that the proposed adaptive algorithm combined with 
the deceptive strategies can deceive humans in long run. The 
experiment designed in this paper was just an example of a 
simple game in which participants predicted the true goal of the 
robot. It can also be applied in other interactive competitive 
games where the computer can deceive the user using the 
adaptive algorithm and available deceptive strategies.  
Naturally, this research is not without limitations. We tested 
the adaptive algorithm only for λ=0.5 because the entropy 
analysis showed this to be the optimal value. Moreover, the 
experimental design was quite simple with only two targets 
involved. In the future, we will implement deceptive 
trajectories in a multi-target environment with targets placed 
randomly on the map. Moreover, we will add a chaser robot that 
the human participant will control to try and catch the aggressor 
robot in a maze environment similar to pac-man. This will 
create a more realistic real time strategy game environment, 
which will give more insight into the advantages of this 
approach in interactive computer games. 
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